How should corporate directors determine what is the "right" decision? For at least the past 30 years the debate has raged as to whether shareholder value should take precedence over corporate social responsibility when crucial decisions arise. Directors face pressure, not least from "ethical" investors, to do the "good" thing when they seek to make the "right" choice. Corporate governance theory has tended to look to agency theory and the need of boards to curb excessive executive power to guide directors' decisions. While useful for those purposes, agency theory provides only limited guidance. Supplementing it with the alternatives -stakeholder theory and stewardship theory -tends to put directors in conflict with their legal obligations to work in the interests of shareholders. This paper seeks to reframe the discussion about corporate governance in terms of the ethical debate between consequential, teleological approaches to ethics and idealist, deontological ones, suggesting that directors are -for good reason -more inclined toward utilitarian judgments like those underpinning shareholder value. But the problems with shareholder value have become so great that a different framework is needed: strategic value, with an emphasis on long-term value creation judged from a decidedly utilitarian standpoint.
Introduction
Whenever a board of directors needs to take any action, its individual members face a decision: what is the right thing to do? Most of the time, choosing the right course is a matter of business judgment on what ethicists call non-moral issues. In a few instances, the choice is a narrow, legal one, where compliance with specific statute or regulation is at stake. But in some cases -and in particular for major decisions like mergers, acquisitions, 1 Donald Nordberg is Editor and Publisher of The BoardAgenda (www.boardagenda.com), a newsletter on corporate affairs, and Senior Lecturer in Strategy at London Metropolitan University, where he also teaches corporate governance. He has been Senior Adviser on corporate governance and risk to The Conference Board Europe and is a member of the European Corporate Governance Institute. down-sizing or large investments -neither the law nor business judgment may be sufficiently clear. These decisions often involve conflicting versions of what's right in a moral sense. Important decision-making in the boardroom is, in short, a matter of ethics.
While directors will choose to act on individual decisions from different theoretical perspectives, their tough calls are likely to be based on more fundamental and often unspoken assumptions about the nature of what is right. The lobby for ethical investment brings with it similarly unspoken assumptions about the ethical basis on which its recommendations are made. This paper explores how ethical frameworks underpin theories of corporate governance to give guidance to directors and in particular to those independent, non-executives who increasingly act as the moral compass for the enterprise.
It suggests, moreover, that the ethical approach that sits most comfortably with the purpose of most corporations is one that rejects important aspects of both stakeholder theory and shareholder value.
Concern about corporate governance has developed historically in response to major crises of confidence, fraud and market failure, and with it development of advances in our thinking about the role that corporations play in the economy and society. The 1929 stock market crash formed at least part of the recognition of just how different the economic and moral imperatives of large listed companies and institutional investors were, compared with the Victorian concept of the company (Berle and Means 1932/1991) . The 1930s also saw recognition of the way that the corporation could be a vehicle for economizing effort through the reduction of transaction costs and freeing resources for productive use elsewhere (Coase 1937; Williamson and Winter 1993) . The focus of what we now call the economics institutions of capitalism (Williamson 1985) lay in showing how capitalism created of social wealth, and not merely the exploitative power of the capitalist.
Another surge of interest came in the early 1990s from what was perhaps a less dramatic string of events but ones which reverberate in the news more than 15 years later: the near simultaneous collapse of Polly Peck, the Bank of Commerce and Credit International and, perhaps most importantly, Robert Maxwell's collection of enterprises (see Wearing 2005 for a detailed discussion). Those events threw into doubt the principlesbased, self-moderating system of accounting, the gentlemanly approach to financial regulation and the cozy, patrician ways in which directors were selected and boards did their work. The result was the Cadbury Report (1992) and eventually what became the Combined Code of corporate governance, which was then emulated in other jurisdictions.
A third wave came from the excesses of the dot-com era of the late 1990s and the subsequent collapse of Enron in 2001, of WorldCom in 2002. There were other cases, too, which might have seemed just as dramatic had they not been preceded by such egregious lapses that had rocked the confidence in US financial markets and led to the implosion of the global accounting practice of Arthur Andersen. The by-product was a new, stringent law on corporate responsibility commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Library of Congress 2002), which led to a new spurt of legislative, regulatory and self-regulatory actions around the world to clean up the mess and reduce the risk of a systemic infection.
The collapse of the German Herstatt Bank in the 1970s, of IBH Holding in the 1980s had demonstrated that continental European countries were not immune from the problem.
Those cases had been dealt with largely by tapping the hidden reserves of the German banking system. In Switzerland, Credit Suisse had similarly made its governance fiasco known as Chiasso disappear by tapping into shareholder funds it had hidden from view.
But in the early years of the 21 st Century that was harder to do. In the 2003 lapses and frauds at the Italian food producer Parmalat and the Dutch supermarket group Ahold came reminders that corporate governance was an issue for all.
What lay behind all of these episodes was a sense of moral hazard associated with the accumulation of financial resources and power in the hands of corporations and the sense that the directors of these corporations, entrusted with society's wealth, were unaccountable and open to corruption. While there were issues about the personal morality of individuals, these episodes raised questions about the ethics of the corporate systems as a whole. These ethical concerns took on four main questions:
· Were managers in distant corporations draining the resources of shareholders for their private use, as Berle and Means had described?
· Was the private use of corporate wealth actually contributing to broader social wealth, as Coase had maintained, or damaging it owing to market failure?
· What assumptions were the directors of corporations using -consciously or unconsciously -when those excesses occurred under their noses?
· What might they have done differently if they had focused on the examining those assumptions?
These questions lie at the heart of what have become the four main theoretical perspectives on the problem of how directors can best control corporate wealth and power: agency theory, shareholder value, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory and at the heart of the claims that ethical investors are making on directors. This paper argues, however, that there is sixth stance available to the individual board member -sometimes confused with the concept of shareholder value -that lies at the heart of the work of independent, non-executive directors: decisions based upon perceived strategic value.
Theories of corporate governance
The workings of the boardroom are, as a matter of necessity, largely hidden from view and therefore from detailed examination. From conversations and public statements of individual directors we've seen emerge several theories that describe how boards operate and seek to prescribe the basis on which directors should make decisions. Stiles and Taylor (2001) outline six theories of corporate governance, though perhaps only three have a useful normative character. First, the legal view is a narrow one, which reflects what some directors might see as their role -fulfilling the obligations of company law -but which provides little worthwhile guidance for their actions. While directors may have de jure responsibility for the company, de facto control rests with management. Two other theories -class hegemony and managerial hegemony -are almost entirely descriptive, though what they describe provides implicit but salutary advice to boards: all too often boards either act to perpetuate a ruling elite or exist as a legal fiction disguising the reality of managerial power. More interesting from an ethical perspective is the organizational economics approach, which uses agency theory to suggest the board's role is to control abuses in managerial power, and transaction-cost theory to lead decision-making. A stewardship approach assumes a psychological stance: managers, and by extension directors, will be motivated by things other than narrow self-interest, to be good stewards, to do a good job. The resource-dependence approach sees outside or non-executive directors as having the role of facilitating access to funds, people and other resources. This can, of course, be seen as a subset of a transaction-cost approach. Having directors with the right contacts means cheaper loans, better terms on supply contracts, the first pick of new business school graduates.
The approach of Stiles and Taylor draws on the analysis of Zahra and Pearce (1989), who describe four perspectives. They share with Stiles and Taylor legal, resource dependence and class hegemony, but Zahra and Pearce focus on agency theory while leaving out direct reference to transaction-cost economics. They do not mention stewardship theory at all.
These surveys of theories of governance, however, leave out perhaps the two most important and conflicting ones: the competing cults of stakeholder theory and shareholder value. Owing to their prescriptive nature and their influence on decisions made by directors, we'll look in greater detail into agency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory to see what ethical assumptions lie behind each, and then elaborate the virtues and drawbacks of shareholder value.
Agency theory
The origins of agency theory in corporate governance are usually traced to the groundbreaking work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932/1991) . Agency theory, a term they never used, came to be seen as a way to examine the issue of individual greed. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued, putting managers in charge of wealth that is not theirs creates, in economic terms, a cost, one they call agency cost. This cost doesn't exist in a business owned by its manager, which is why the problems of governance in a private company are different from those in public companies. In what Berle and Means call the modern corporation, however, the problem cannot be eliminated, but it can be controlled.
Since this realization, public companies around the world have developed incentives that seek to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Controlling agency costs lay behind the growth of the use of stock options and other equity-based pay systems, rather than relying solely on salary and bonuses to motivate managers. Rational managers will see that it is not in their interests to divert the company's resources to their private use when they have so much more to gain from taking actions that benefit shareholders as well as themselves. In large public companies, a second layer of potential problems arise.
Shareholders employ directors to watch over the work of managers, creating a second moral hazard, or put another way a second layer of agency costs.
From an ethical perspective, however, the focus on economics in both instances changes the moral choice from one of "right" or "wrong" into one of "better" or "worse".
Stakeholder theory
The stakeholder view of corporate governance is often associated with Japanese and continental European practice, and perhaps most closely with Germany, where law has required that half the seats on supervisory boards go to representatives of the workforce, and where custom has long mandated that a company's bankers and large-block shareholders have seats as well.
The term "stakeholder" is recorded as early as 1708, when it meant a neutral party holding the stakes of the contestants in a wager. But that's not at all the meaning it has developed over the past quarter of a century. "Stakeholder" has deliberate echoes of "shareholder" and even more of "stockholder", the more common American term. That rhetorical device boosts employees, suppliers, customers and outside interests to a linguistic status with something approaching the same claim to rights over a company's activities.
Its origins in the theory of corporate governance are somewhat difficult to trace. R. Edward Freeman links it most directly to the Stanford Research Institute in the early 1960s, though he accepts he couldn't quite pinpoint it (see Freeman 1984, p. 49 n1 ). Freeman defines stakeholders as "any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation's purpose" (1984, p. vi) . SRI and other strategic thinkers used stakeholder concept mainly as a tool for strategic analysis. It was in part a result of the growing recognition of the complexity of strategy -that the company wasn't simply a production system, where strategy was based primarily on products and the means to produce them, as it had been seen for first half of the 20 th Century. Gradually strategists had come to appreciate that corporations created value through the complex interaction of various networks of relationships. Examples of that approach range from Igor Ansoff's thinking in the 1960s through to Michael Porter's conceptions of industry analysis in the 1980s, the balanced scorecards of the 1990s and current work on customer relationships and their lifetime value (see Porter 1980; Ansoff 1987; Kaplan and Norton 1992; Bell et al. 2002; Rust et al. 2004) . But considering the interests of stakeholders in strategy doesn't imply stakeholders should be regarded as the or even a purpose of corporate activity. Indeed, Ansoff argued forcefully against the stakeholder approach, drawing a distinction between a corporation's "responsibilities" to a wide range of interested parties and its "objectives", which guide management to fulfilling the company's purpose (Ansoff 1987, p. 53) .
Strong versions of stakeholder theory challenge the assumption that directors and by extension managers have their sole duty to the company's owners. Indeed, Freeman even defends exploiting the word "stakeholder" precisely because it sounds like "stockholder". Words, he writes, "make a difference in how we see the world. By using 'stakeholder' managers and theorists alike will come to see these groups as having a 'stake'" (1984, p. 45) .
Stakeholders have legitimacy because they can affect the direction of the company; it is legitimate for management to spend time and resources on stakeholders, he argues. That is, however, still some way from arguing that these people and groups are "ends" of corporate purpose, to which corporate boards owe a duty, rather than just "means" to the end of shareholder value.
The usual argument against the strong versions of stakeholder theory is that shareholders have their entire investment at risk, while suppliers, customers and employees are in general receive benefits from the corporation contemporaneously, and enjoy the added protection of prior standing in contract if things go wrong. But Freeman, writing with William Evan and using examples based on US law, pointed out that shareholders, managers, customers, suppliers and employees all have their contractual rights protected by one or another aspect of law. "Another way to look at these safeguards is that they force management to balance the interests of stockholders and themselves on the one hand with the interests of customers, suppliers and, other stakeholders on the other" (Freeman and Evan 1990, p. 347 ).
Can we find guidance in company law? In many jurisdictions the matter is quite clear:
directors are responsible and accountable to shareholders. But that legal accountability is only a narrow sense of the ethical issues directors face, and with mounting public pressure -from corporate governance scandals and environmental concerns -even the legal context Most arguments for a stakeholder approach to governance aren't based on a narrow legal claim, however, but appeal instead to a larger moral purpose. Freeman declared that the ordinary view of corporations -with shareholder value at the center -"is or at least should be intellectually dead" (Freeman 1994, p. 14) That view doesn't go undisputed, either in its method of argument (see Child and Marcoux 1999 for an example) or its conclusions about the appropriateness of stakeholder theory. Indeed, John Hendry declared that the normative stakeholder theory and Freeman in particular had overshot. "To the extent that they have their sights too high they have also undermined their own position by sacrificing credibility and introducing major problems," he wrote (Hendry 2001, p. 159) . Not only was the emphasis on stakeholder rights wrong in theory, they were falling out of practice, he said. Stakeholder concerns had "become increasingly marginal to the corporate governance debate" not just in the US but also in such "stakeholder oriented societies" as Germany, Japan and South Korea (p. 173). Hendry was, of course, writing before the next big crisis in governance was to occur -the collapse of Enron, which robbed employees of pension rights and led to the biggest changes in public accountability of executive directors since the creation of the US Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930s.
Stakeholder theorists seem to be representing two different ethical perspectives. The Freeman and Evan approach was, in some ways, making the argument on the devil's own terms. They said that seeing the corporation as a contracting mechanism, as Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) had done, provided a way of showing the stakeholder theory was about tangible costs and benefits, a means of reducing the economic burden of the social contract, the weak version of the theory, where the ethical determination is based on the consequences of the action. This is far from a typical stakeholder argument, which holds that businesses are accountable to larger aims than profit maximization (Evan and Freeman 1993; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Crowther and Caliyurt 2004) . John Hasnas says: "When viewed as a normative theory, the stakeholder theory asserts that, regardless of whether stakeholder management leads to improved financial performance, managers should manage the business for the benefit of all stakeholders" (Hasnas 1998, p. 26) . This is just the type of conclusion that is sure to raise the hackles of many business people, and led Milton Friedman to pen his famous retort that the social responsibility of business is to make money (Friedman 1970 ).
It's not surprising to see how stakeholder theory became conflated with corporate social responsibility, though we can argue that there is a difference. Indeed, the devil's argument (e.g. Freeman and Evan 1990) might well be making an argument that treating suppliers, customers and employees well reduces transaction costs, thereby contributing to profits.
But the more common view of stakeholder theory is that advanced by these authors and a host of followers that respect for individuals is a greater good that businesses cannot ignore (Evan and Freeman 1993) . The discussion of an even broader theory of social contract for business (Donaldson and Dunfee 1994) lies behind more contemporary notions, including that od the UK think-tank Tomorrow's Company: businesses require a "license to operate" from society (Hampson 2007) . This approach forms the basis of what we call legitimacy theory (e.g. Guthrie and Parker 1989; Lindblom 1994; Deephouse and Carter 2005) .
Stewardship theory
As a description of board practice, stewardship theory suggests that directive will be motivated by some larger than personal wealth. Drawing on organizational psychology, it suggests that self-esteem and fulfillment loom large in their decision-making, as Abraham Maslow (1943) had suggested in his hierarchy of needs. As a prescription, however, it contends that individual directors should look after the interests of someone or something larger than their personal self-interest. Some may be guided by a code of conduct or statement of corporate purpose, like the charitable aims of the foundation that owns 90 percent of the German manufacturing giant Robert Bosch GmbH, the Credo of Johnson & Johnson or the trust principles that have protected the editorial integrity of the news operations of Reuters Group plc. In other cases, a legalistic approach would look at their fiduciary obligations as described by company law. But on many decisions, the law is silent and the director needs to look elsewhere to find the guiding principle. Some directors see their roles as being stewards of a particular interest. When a major shareholder secures a seat on the board, its director will understandably be tied to that shareholder's aims, whatever company law might say. That's why we saw new emphasis on the role of independent, non-executive, outside directors in the governance reforms introduced with, say, year. Independent directors, these reforms hoped, would be stewards of some greater good.
But what?
An ethical framework for governance
These theories of corporate governance encompass what in ethics are known as consequential (sometimes called teleological) and idealistic (also called deontological) approaches. Deciding the "right" course of action can be based on an assessment of the benefits arising from it (morality based on the consequences of the action) or by obeying some more general rule or ideal state (some ethical principle) irrespective of the outcomes of the action. The former is probably best known in its 18 th and 19 th Century incarnationutilitarianism, embracing John Stuart Mill's notion of the greatest good for the greatest number (Mill 1863 (Mill /1991 ) -which underpinned much of the development of the field of economics. But there is another strand of consequential thinking that also plays a role in corporate governance, ethical egoism, in which the individual decides on the basis of what is best for himself 2 , irrespective of the consequences for others. Among its proponents were Epicurus, Hobbes and Nietzsche, philosophers who perhaps no longer have the great fans clubs they once enjoyed, except perhaps among CEOs (for a crystalline exposition of ethical theory, including the distinctions between act-and rule-utilitarianism, see Frankena 1963) .
But this thinking -when other actors invoke governance mechanisms like contract and the force to law to constraint the actions of the egoists -lies at the heart of the assumptions we see at work in agency theory. The CEO, indeed any self-interested actor, will seek to maximize personal gains. The role of corporate governance is, therefore, to constrain his actions without dampening his drive to succeed. In agency theory, the board uses negotiation with the CEO and pay policies for the rest of senior management to channel energy toward common outcomes, albeit with different specific goals: we assume the CEO will attempt to maximize his wealth. If the way to do that also maximizes shareholder 2 For convenience, the masculine form will embrace both genders. The current custom in polite English speech of pluralizing to escape gender bias (e.g. "the person themselves") jars especially badly here. We are speaking of 1) individual actions and, 2) in the context of corporate governance lapses, overwhelming male perpetrators. wealth, then job well done. This ethical stance underpins nearly all the traditional corporate governance literature, as Hendry's conclusions infer (Hendry 2001) . Business culture breeds people who seek to maximize profits, personal or corporate. If the means to that end differ depending on whether we are looking at the personal or corporate, greed is widely thought to take precedence over the sense of corporate purpose. Nor is this approach confined to the boardroom. Much management literature and the "how-to" approach to organizational change are about aligning personal goals and incentives with corporate aims.
Stakeholder theory, in its strong form, approaches corporate decision-making from a deontological perspective. This is especially true among proponents of what we have come to call corporate social responsibility, around which we see developing an industry of "socially responsible" or "ethical" investors (though one suspects that many of the managers of SRI funds take a rather more ethically egoistical approach). There have been many attempts to demonstrate that what's good for society (in a deontological sense) is also good for financial performance (in a utilitarian sense). The evidence to date, however, is less than entirely convincing. This lack of empirical support for the (financial) value of corporate social responsibility hasn't silenced its proponents, giving greater evidence that their stance is fundamentally deontological and idealistic in the philosophical sense.
Indeed, much of the academic literature in support of stakeholder theory comes overtly from this perspective. Donaldson and Preston (1995) , for example, see stakeholder theorists drawing support mainly from the normative aspects of its ethical foundation -a nod, at least, toward deontology. The philosophical tradition for stakeholder theory draws most directly from Immanuel Kant (for examples, see Evan and Freeman 1993; Donaldson and Dunfee 1994; Hasnas 1998) , whose notion of the "categorical imperative" -an a priori obligation -formed the heart of what John Stuart Mill, his utilitarian predecessors and his followers set out to dislodge. There is some greater good, in Kant's view, that "is not derived from the goodness of the results which it produces" (Kant 1785 (Kant /1964 . When extended to embrace an obligation upon business owners to respect some larger and largely unwritten contract with society for their license to operate, we hear echoes of other philosophical traditions: Rousseau's social contract and Marx, which contribute to the skepticism of business people, reared in capitalism and steeped in the thinking of Adam Smith, whose thinking in part informed Mill's version of utilitarianism.
Stewardship theory arises as well from deontological roots. Though not nearly so well explored in the academic literature, it has an intuitive appeal to many people in business. In the corporate governance literature it's more associated with the governance of charities, where by definition actors -in management or among the trustees -are presumed not to be seeking to maximize profits but rather working for some greater good. But stewardship is not confined to the charities, either. Peter Weinberg, a partner at the boutique investment bank Perella Weinberg Partners and former Goldman Sachs executive, wrote of what a privilege was to join the board of a public company. "Serving on a board is like taking on a position in public service," he wrote in the Financial Times. "It is not (and should not be) a wealth creation opportunity but a chance to play a role in the proper workings of our marketplace" (Weinberg 2006) . Boardroom pay has improved markedly since the scandals of 2001 and 2002 and the resulting demands for more non-executive directors who must spend more time on their mandates. Indeed, it is difficult to see how personal profit maximization would lead many of the current crew of serving independent, non-executive directors at public companies to take up those roles when there was much better money to be in private equity. This is not necessarily true for all outside directors of public companies, however.
Despite the move in recent years away from deep entanglement of German banks with the equity of German industry, many bankers still sit on supervisory boards of German companies, taking those roles not for personal gain, nor out of a sense of what Weinberg (2006) called public service. They are, however, serving at least in part to serve a different higher purpose -that of looking after the interests of their bank's loan portfolio. Like the lawyers, bankers and accountants who so often populated American company boards over decades, this, too, is stewardship, but of a different kind than that envisaged in the calls for "independence" of mind and purpose invoked in the Higgs review of the role of nonexecutive directors in the UK (Higgs 2003) , the NYSE listing rule changes (New York Stock Exchange 2003) and the German government-backed code ("German Kodex" 2002 , among other governance regulation and principles. But it is still deontological in nature, as there is a greater good that guides those directors' decisions -just not one that Rousseau or Marx might have cherished. Nor is stewardship theory limited in use to the boardroom. Muth and Donaldson (1998) point out that stewardship, unlike agency theory, recognizes non-financial motives of managers, for example, the need for advancement and recognition, intrinsic job satisfaction, respect for authority and the work ethic. But these three broad theories of corporate governance -one rooted in utilitarian ethics, the others in deontological -miss out the key area most on the minds of corporate directors: shareholder theory.
Shareholder value
The mantra of corporate management at least since the 1980s in what is often called Anglo-Saxon capitalism has been "shareholder value". It's a measure of the financial rewards delivered to shareholders through the combination of cash (dividends and share buy-backs) and the capital gains achieved on public or private equity markets. interest of the holders of the greatest number of shares outstanding. Mapping the ethical approach to the interest served gives us a map of governance theories like those in Table 1 .
With the inclusion of shareholder theory, our faith in the economic purpose of the corporation is restored and the sound economist sitting on a board of directors has an ethical framework to guide decisions. End of story.
But not quite.
The problems with shareholder value
Discerning what is in the interests of shareholders has never been an easy task.
Founders and their families have different interests from venture capitalists looking for an early exit; both have different interests from the institutional investor who has just purchased shares during an initial public offering from either of them. Do you set strategy for the investor who holds the shares today, or the one who is likely to hold them tomorrow? Or in three years' time?
In the comparatively relaxed days of the 1980s, when all directors had to worry about was corporate raiders and vulture capitalists, delivering shareholder value was a pretty safe ethical bet. In Germany, where the tax system, accounting conventions and company law requiring Mitbestimmung (worker-co-determination of corporate policy) constrained the efforts of supervisory boards to deliver profits, yes, even in Germany shareholder value became the vogue.
Shareholder-value rules-of-thumb grew from the broad patterns of share ownership. In the US, shareholders of large public companies were mainly domestic. About half were private individuals, the rest institutional investors of a conventional sort. In the UK, ownership was also domestic but perhaps less so than in the US. Institutions made up a large majority of the holdings, though they were, again, largely of a conventional nature: domestic insurance and pension funds. In continental Europe, however, even in the early 1980s, a large proportion of shares -a quarter to half, depending on the country -were held by foreign institutions, many of them in the UK. The globalization of capital markets, the introduction of new instruments and the development of fast, electronic trading platform was about to change all that.
By the start of the new century, derivative markets, short-selling, hedge funds and cross-border trading made the task of understanding the interests of shareholders not just difficult, but impossible and even perverse. Consider the simplest of these developments:
collective investment tools like mutual funds or what in the European Union are fetchingly called as UCITS. Their growth has accelerated the concentration of corporate share ownership in the hands of institutional investors. Some are index-tracking or passively managed funds, where the interests of the fund lay in overall performance of the market.
The owners' economic interests are, therefore, different from those of the company in its competitive marketplace. A case in point is the takeover battle between Barclays and a consortium led by Royal Bank of Scotland for control of the Dutch bank ABN-Amro. The antagonists shared many of the same shareholders, whose greater interests might lie more in preventing bidding war than in winning or even losing. Deciding what to do in the interests of shareholders might be deciding to do nothing at all, because doing anything might damage a competitor that your owners also own.
Even the managers of active funds, however, can see their economic interests diverge from those of their beneficiaries, introducing another level of agency relationship, and with it another agency problem. The competition between them for short-term financial performance led to rapid portfolio turnover. Even in 2002, a dull year for equity markets, the average duration of an equity investment by a US mutual fund was a mere 11 months (see Bogle 2003) , which raises the question of what interest it would have in the long-term performance of the company. Nor was this short-term focus merely a US phenomenon.
Actively managed UK funds turned over their portfolios about every two to three years.
The pressure to deliver short-term fund performance -and with it the focus on delivering share-price appreciation earnings announcements -lies at the heart of what a lot of people, including many corporate managers, feel is wrong with the Anglo-Saxon model of financial markets (Tonello 2006; Aspen Institute 2007; CED 2007) .
But their interests were still easier for a corporate director to discern than those of the other players in the equity market. Hedge funds using high-octane, heavily leveraged strategies have become a large force, not just in the volume of their trading activities but in the absolute numbers of shares they hold. Moreover, many used instruments known as "contracts for difference" to create an economic interest in the company's performance If that weren't enough, hedge-fund activity supercharged the practice of stock-lending, in which a traditional institutional investor -even a passively managed index-trackermight lend shares from their portfolios for a fixed period of time in exchange for a payment of interest from the hedge fund. Stock-lending gives the hedge fund temporary ownership, creating two types of trading strategies. One involved short-selling -selling shares today in the expectation of buying them back later at a lower price. This means the economic interest of the (temporary) owner of the shares is in seeing the company perform badly. In the cases of some small companies, we've even seen the short interest -the number of share sold in this fashion -represent a majority of the voting stock. For a brief period, therefore, it was, in a utilitarian sense of greater value to shareholders for the company to go bust.
The second trading strategy of hedge funds has been to join the ranks of shareholderactivist fund managers. This approach involves taking control of the shares for the sake to effecting a change of direction on the company, to pursue a particular acquisition or to change the chief executive. Table 2 .
What is missing, though, is the big picture, a theory to guide the large, strategic decisions, the ones that involve a substantial commitment of shareholder funds or the opportunity costs of abandoning one line of business for the sake of entering another. 
Strategic value
This framework for the ethics of corporate governance wasn't, perhaps, quite complete.
Instead of looking "corporate" aims, we might better have formulated the notion as serving shareholder interests. The teleological, utilitarian stance remains shareholder value, with all the problems that entails, but the deontological focus becomes not that of stakeholder theory but of a narrower view: the one of socially responsible investors. A third and broader category of aims -collective ones -can be added to the framework to accommodate the deontological approaches of stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility, involving the interests of those who aren't shareholders. That leaves a gap, in ethical terms utilitarian and in scope collective, which we shall call strategic value (See Table 3 ). The shareholder perspectives are both problematic. Shareholder value still suffers from every director's inability to assess it in a meaningful way. Ethical investing operates on the hope that social responsibility will be profitable but on the conviction that even if it isn't, it is still the right thing to do. Stakeholder theory -especially in its guise as corporate social responsibility -carries over the confusion of means and ends.
Strategic value, while not easy to determine, asks the director to take actions on the basis of what's best in a utilitarian sense for the viability and persistence of the enterprise.
